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Abstract  
In this paper we investigate the efficacy of illicit electoral tactics and the characteristics 
which make a society prone to such tactics. We first investigate the chances of an incumbent 
head of government winning an election. We find that in those elections in which illicit 
tactics were prevalent the chances of incumbent victory increase substantially, more than 
doubling the expected duration in office. Further, illicit tactics sharply reduce the importance 
of good economic performance for survival in office. We then investigate what makes a 
society prone to illicit electoral tactics. Both structural conditions and institutions matter. 
Societies that are small, low-income, and resource-rich have little chance of a clean election 
unless these conditions are offset by checks and balances such as veto points and a free press. 
Aid has offsetting effects, the net effect being modest. We show that these results are robust 
to different measures of the conduct of elections and to fixed effects. Finally, we revisit the 
Jones-Olken result that individual leaders matter for economic performance and find that it 
holds only where leaders are not disciplined by well-conducted elections.  3 
 
1. Introduction
The fall of the Soviet Union triggered a ‘fourth wave of democratization’
1 as a result of 
which most developing countries now hold regular elections. This appeared to constitute a 
radical increase in the accountability of previously autocratic governments to their citizens. 
As such it promised not only an improvement in human rights, but in economic performance. 
Since their independence, many of these developing country governments had chosen 
economic policies that favoured elite rent-seeking at the expense of broad-based growth. 
Unfortunately, electoral misconduct is common. Although many authoritarian regimes 
subject themselves to elections
2, they deploy illicit tactics which improve the chances of 
incumbent victory. Schedler (2002) argues that these elections are designed to generate only 
the appearance of democratic legitimacy, perhaps more in the eyes of external actors such as 
aid agencies than of citizens. Hence, some degree of pluralism and competition are tolerated 
in order to make it feasible to conduct contested elections. However, these elections do not 
mark a genuine shift to democracy.  
In this paper we demonstrate that electoral misconduct is highly efficacious for incumbent 
politicians. We suggest that proneness to illicit tactics is substantially dependent upon a few 
socio-economic characteristics: some societies have little chance of holding a clean election 
unless restraining institutions are already in place. International pressure, proxied by both the 
fall of the Soviet Union and aid flows, has significant and predominantly benign effects. We 
also show that illicit tactics are associated with poor economic outcomes. Thus, from the 
perspective of economic development, electoral misconduct is the Achilles heel of 
democracy. 
Our contribution is structured in the following way.  In Section 2 we introduce a simple 
model that helps to predict the circumstances in which an incumbent politician will resort to 
electoral misconduct. The core of the paper is empirical and is divided into three sections. It 
presents a new global data set which integrates data on changes in incumbency with data on 
elections classified according to the quality of their conduct. The preliminary step, 
undertaken in Section 3, establishes that illicit tactics are highly effective in increasing the 
                                                 
1 For a discussion see McFaul (2002). 
2 Diamond (2002) estimates that about 86 percent of all countries now hold elections. 4 
 
expected duration of an incumbent in office. In Section 4 we then investigate the structural 
characteristics that make a society prone to illicit tactics, guided by the analysis of Section 2. 
In Section 5 we turn to whether the quality of elections matters for economic performance. A 
final section presents some conclusions. 
   
2. A Simple Model of Resort to Illicit Tactics 
The objective of our model is to determine which factors make it more likely for incumbent 
political leaders to use illicit tactics in elections. The factors suggested by the model can then 
be tested empirically.  
The model is in the form of a game between an incumbent and a representative elector. We 
assume that the incumbent benefits from the ego-rents of office, which accrue as E per term, 
and can also choose whether to receive financial rents from embezzlement which accrue at R 
per term.  We first depict an electoral system with a binding constitutional two-term limit 
since this limits the game to two periods. 
The game opens when the incumbent has just begun his first term in office. During this first 
term the incumbent has two choices, one on economic policy, and the other on the conduct of 
the election at the end of the first term. That election will determine whether the leader 
remains in office for a second (and final) term. 
The incumbent’s choice of economic strategy is between a pro-growth policy which 
generates growth of g, and a policy which yields zero growth but generates rents, R, which 
the politician expropriates. The incumbent’s choice of economic strategy is fully observed by 
the representative elector. The elector prefers the pro-growth strategy to the rent-seeking 
strategy and votes accordingly. If the incumbent has chosen the pro-growth strategy the 
representative elector votes for him in the elections at the end of the first term, whereas if the 
incumbent has chosen the rent-seeking strategy, the representative elector votes against him.   
The incumbent also chooses electoral tactics. Since the choice of the representative voter can 
be perfectly anticipated by the incumbent, the sequence of voter choice and choice of 
electoral tactics is inconsequential. If the chosen tactics of the incumbent are licit, (F=0), 
electoral success is dependent upon the achievement of growth. If the chosen tactics are 5 
 
illicit, (F=1), victory is assured but their use carries a penalty, P, the value of which can be 
thought of as depending upon the efficacy of the checks and balances in the society. 
The incumbent maximizes utility, which is assumed to be additive in the terms E, R and P, 
with respect to the choices of g and F.  
The solution to this simple game is determined by comparing the utility that accrues to the 
incumbent from each of three strategies: pro-growth strategy combined with licit tactics; rent-
seeking strategy combined with licit tactics; and rent-seeking strategy combined with illicit 
tactics. The remaining logical possibility of pro-growth strategy combined with illicit tactics 
is strictly dominated by the first strategy, but depending upon the values E, R and P any of 
the other three strategies could be utility-maximizing. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
Figure 1 depicts the options. The first option of pro-growth and licit tactics achieves a return 
of 2E. The second option is that prior to the election he chooses rent-seeking rather than 
growth, but then chooses to use licit tactics in the election (F=0). As a result he loses the 
election but nevertheless is able to keep the rents from the first term in office. The return to 
this choice is E+R. The third option is to choose rents rather than growth but then choose the 
use of illicit tactics (F=1). The return to this strategy is 2E + 2R – P. The incumbent wins a 
second term in office, but is punished for the use of illicit tactics. He gets to keep the rents 
from the previous term and gains rents during his second term. The three choices each apply 
over a specific range. 
The incumbent chooses not to rent-seek and uses licit tactics (F=0) iff E>R & 2R<P.  
The incumbent chooses rent-seeking and licit tactics (F=0) iff R>E & E+R<P.  
The incumbent chooses rent-seeking and illicit tactics (F=1) iff 2R>P & E+R>P.  
There are thus two critical values of parameters which lead to illicit tactics having economic 
consequences. In the range E>R the critical value is R<1/2P. Above this value the incumbent 
uses his power to steal the election in order to switch economic strategy during his first term 
from growth to rents. Conversely, in the range E<R the critical value is E+R<P. Above this 
value the incumbent who would in any case sacrifice growth for rents during his first term is 
uses illicit tactics to gain a second term. To guard against both of these problems the penalty 6 
 
incurred by resort to illicit tactics must be high relative to both the ego-rents of office and the 
rents from financial embezzlement. 
So far we have assumed that there is a binding constitutional limit of two terms in office. We 
now remove this term limit. Now, if the incumbent wins the election at the end of his first 
term, there is a further benefit in the form of the option value of office in the third and 
subsequent terms. For simplicity, we assume that this option value is unaffected by whether 
the incumbent has won a second term through licit or illicit tactics so that it can be depicted 
as a single positive value, O.   
The introduction of this option value changes the decision calculus facing the incumbent 
during the first term. Revisiting the three choices, the returns to each are now: 
The incumbent chooses not to rent-seek and uses licit tactics (F=0) iff E+O>R & 2R<P.  
The incumbent chooses rent-seeking and licit tactics (F=0) iff R>E+O & E+R+O<P.  
The incumbent chooses rent-seeking and illicit tactics (F=1) iff 2R>P & E+R+O>P.  
Comparing these pay-offs, the removal of term limits has no effect on the choice between the 
first and third options since both now include the option value. An incumbent who is 
choosing not to garner rents and hence does not resort to illicit tactics in a term-limited 
system, will not switch to illicit tactics in an unlimited system. However, the removal of the 
term limit does alter the choice between the second and third options, making it less attractive 
for the rent-seeking politician to choose licit tactics at the first election because he will forgo 
the future option of rent-seeking. The penalty would now have to be larger in order to prevent 
a rent-seeking incumbent from using illicit tactics to steal the elections. The remaining 
choice, between the first and second options, does not involve a switch between licit and 
illicit tactics and so it not germane to our question. However, it is interesting to note that the 
removal of the term limit increases the relative attraction of the first option in which the 
incumbent chooses not to embezzle. Hence, an implication of the model is that although term 
limits would reduce the incidence of illicit electoral tactics, they would increase the incidence 
of financial corruption.  
The model has three testable implications for electoral tactics. First, and most obviously, the 
attraction of illicit tactics relative to licit tactics is reduced the higher is the penalty for their 7 
 
use. This is readily testable since the penalty can plausibly be proxied by a variety of 
observable checks and balances that differ over time and between societies. The second 
implication is that the attraction of illicit tactics relative to licit tactics is increased by the 
value of the potential rents from financial embezzlement. This follows directly from the 
conditions under which the third option is preferred. This prediction is readily testable since, 
as we discuss in the next section, there are defensible proxies for the value of the potential 
rents from financial embezzlement. However, it is not a very powerful test since the 
association between rents and illicit electoral tactics is intrinsically plausible.   The third 
testable implication is that term limits should reduce the incentive to adopt illicit tactics. This 
is a somewhat stronger test since it is essentially about differences-in-differences: a common 
level of rents should do less damage to the conduct of elections if there are term limits.  
Finally, illicit tactics have selection effects on the pool of politicians. To illustrate this we 
distinguish between two types of politician according to their preferences. The first type is 
characterized as above, while the second type does not value embezzlement. Confining the 
analysis to the case of term limits, in societies where P is so high that illicit tactics are not 
chosen by politicians of either type, financially honest politicians receive a pay-off of 2E. 
Dishonest politicians receive a pay-off of the maximum of 2E and E+R. In the extreme case 
in which P is reduced to zero, the pay-off to honest politicians is unaltered, whereas that to 
the dishonest rises to 2E+2R. Hence, the extent to which illicit tactics are penalized affects 
the attraction of politics for dishonest politicians relative to honest politicians. As Besley 
(2006) argues, in the long term equilibrium such selection effects may be more consequential 
than the direct effect of incentives. In a political system with only weak penalties on illicit 
tactics the people who enter politics may be motivated by the opportunities for corruption. 
Being so motivated, they find illicit tactics particularly useful. Thus, if the political system 
started with penalties on illicit tactics that were sufficient to deter them but then for some 
exogenous reason these penalties are reduced, the composition of politicians would gradually 
deteriorate as the society transitioned from the initial equilibrium to the new one and this 
would progressively accentuate the resort to illicit tactics.   
In the above model we have made the key assumption that illicit tactics guarantee electoral 
victory. While in extremis this is clearly the case, we want to establish empirically whether 
within the normal range of illicit tactics they confer a substantial electoral advantage. This is 
the objective of following section.  8 
 
3. How tempting is electoral misconduct? 
 
Even if electoral misconduct is common, it need not constitute more than a minor blemish. 
For example, if all contestants resort to misconduct to a similar extent then outcomes might 
be largely unaffected. However, Calingaert (2006) suggests that ruling political leaders have 
more opportunities to rig elections than their challengers. Incumbents can rig the electoral 
process by interfering with voter registration, electoral campaigning, procedure on election 
day, and in the final vote count and tabulation. Incumbents have access to state resources and 
so are better-placed to finance bribery; through state patronage they are better placed to 
influence the officials who count ballots; and through control of the security forces they are 
better placed to intimidate those voters who are unlikely to be supporters into abstention. We 
therefore investigate whether the resort to electoral misconduct significantly improves the 
chances of an incumbent being re-elected.  
For our empirical analysis we collated a data set on political leaders and executive elections. 
Our main sources were Archigos, a new database on political leaders (Chiozza, Goemans and 
Gleditsch, 2009) and the Database of Political Institutions (DPI, Beck et al 2001) from which 
we obtained election data. Archigos identifies the ‘effective’ leader of a country, i.e. the 
person that de facto exercises power in a country. In parliamentary regimes, the prime 
minister is coded as the leader, in presidential systems, the president. In some instances the 
Archigos and DPI databases disagree on the question whether a country has a presidential, 
parliamentary or assembly system and thus have a different understanding of who the leader 
and when his/her election took place. We use Chauvet and Collier (2009) to resolve any 
discrepancies. This provides us with data on 786 elections in 155 countries during the period 
1975-2004. As Table 1 shows, in 71 percent of these elections incumbents were standing for 
re-election. This is a relatively high proportion, because even in countries with a term limit 
on political leadership, there are few elections in which no incumbent was standing. For 
example in recent US history there were only five elections in which none of the candidates 
was an incumbent (1960, 1968, 1988, 2000, 2008). Another reason for the high proportion of 
incumbent elections is that election defeat is only one of many reasons why political leaders 
lose power. Often leaders leave their office due to votes of no-confidence or other legal or 
illegal challenges before their term has come to an end. Their successor then contests the 
election as the incumbent at the end of the term in office, one example would be the 
resignation of Margaret Thatcher in 1990. Her successor, John Major, contested and won the 9 
 
1992 elections. Thus, often leadership turnover occurs during the term and not due to 
elections. 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
So far we have considered all elections, with no concerns as to whether their quality is good. 
We now divide the elections into ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ elections. Based on the concept of 
Chauvet and Collier (2009) of good quality elections we consider any election ‘clean’ if it 
meets two conditions. The first is that the quality of the election should receive a rating of 
more than 6 on the DPI scale. This corresponds to elections in which multiple parties stand 
and win seats and the leader is elected in a competitive manner. The second condition is that 
the DPI does not judge that fraud could have had an impact of the outcome of the election. 
Table 1 lists the number of clean and dirty elections. About 41 percent of all elections are of 
bad quality and/or fraudulent and thus classified as dirty. The percentage of dirty elections 
among the elections in which incumbents are standing is only a little higher at 45 percent. 
Thus, at least superficially, there is little indication that incumbents manipulate election 
procedures by lowering the election quality or through fraud.  
As discussed above, a number of country studies indicate that incumbents are more likely to 
win elections. The initial cross-country evidence supports this finding. Table 2 shows out of 
the 558 elections in which incumbents stood, in 378 of them (68 percent), the incumbent 
won. Incumbents have a much higher chance of winning dirty elections (81 percent) than 
clean ones (57 percent). 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
We now turn to regression analysis to examine the probability of incumbent victory. Our 
model choice is informed by the large empirical literature on (economic) voting. Most of the 
research is limited to single country, dominated by studies on US presidential and 
congressional elections
3. There are only a few studies using a cross-section of countries and 
these are limited to wealthy, industrialised countries (Duch and Stevenson, 2006). Research 
of US presidential elections suggests that elections in which the incumbent is not standing are 
much more difficult to forecast (Sidman, Mark and Lebo 2008).  Although economic 
performance is a strong predictor in US presidential elections, voters do not seem to attribute 
                                                 
3 For a recent overview of US presidential election forecasting see Campbell and Lewis-Beck (2008). 10 
 
economic success to the White House party successor candidate. Examining incumbent and 
non-incumbent elections, Norpoth (2000) finds that economic growth only predicts voting in 
incumbent elections, in non-incumbent elections economic growth is insignificant. 
 
While we base our model choice on this research, we depart from the existing literature by 
using a global panel of countries. This invariably limits our choice of explanatory variables, 
for example we do not have approval ratings for a large sample of countries. However, we 
start with a general model and our explanatory variables include some structural 
characteristics about the society, an indicator for the recent wave of democratization, a 
measure of economic performance, some characteristics of the incumbent and a measure of 
illicit tactics. The results are presented in Table 3, column 1. Since the end of the Cold War, 
referred to here as the ‘democracy wave’, incumbents have been less likely to win elections. 
Incumbents in Sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to win than leaders in other 
countries. 
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
As suggested in the literature on economic voting
4 higher economic growth makes an 
incumbent win more likely. It also confirms the results by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). In 
their models of political leadership they find evidence that the provision of public goods, 
proxied by growth, extends the duration of a leader’s stay in power. We measure economic 
growth in the previous two years: traditionally election forecasters have used performance 
indicators much closer to the elections, for example growth in the 6 months prior to the 
elections, but we do not have this information for the entire sample of countries. We also 
control for income per capita and find a weak positive effect on incumbent wins. 
 
However, there are a number of variables which seem to be insignificant in determining the 
incumbent’s chances of winning the election. We include controls for the structure of the 
society and the economy, but population growth, education measures, and rents are all 
insignificant.  
 
                                                 
4 See for example Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000). 11 
 
In addition to these economic and societal characteristics we also include information on the 
incumbent. Age of the incumbent was a significant determinant in gubernatorial defeats in the 
study by Besley and Case (1995). Older governors were less likely to be elected. In our cross 
country study the age of the incumbent is not significant. We also account for the manner in 
which office was taken in the first place. Incumbents who came to power through legal 
processes are no more likely to be re-elected than the ones who took office in an irregular 
manner, for example through coups or being imposed by foreign governments. 
 
Our measure of ‘clean’ elections has a negative effect on incumbent wins, i.e. when the 
elections are competitive and there are no illicit tactics incumbents have a lower chance of 
winning. In order to evaluate the importance of illicit tactics we drop the insignificant 
variables one by one and arrive at the core model in column 2
 5. Illicit tactics have effects that 
are both highly significant and substantial. At the mean of the other variables an incumbent 
increases the prospect of victory from 62 percent to 84 percent if he uses illicit tactics. This 
difference in the probability of victory has magnified implications for the expected duration 
in office, which is perhaps the more pertinent metric of incentives facing leaders. Consider 
the decision problem facing an incumbent autocrat who converts to democracy, with an 
immediate election followed by the prospect of further elections every four years. If he 
subjects himself to clean elections his expected remaining duration in office is typically 6.4 
years. If he adopts dirty elections his remaining duration is a much healthier 15.8 years.
6  
In addition to the effects of the economy and illicit tactics we find some evidence that 
freedom of the press may act as a control mechanism on incumbents. First, we add a measure 
of press freedom to our core model in column 3. This variable takes three values, one if press 
freedom is severely limited, two if there is some freedom and three if the press is free. 
Although the inclusion of this variable reduces our sample size we find that all our previous 
results are confirmed. Press freedom makes it more difficult for incumbents to win elections. 
                                                 
5 We also examined a number of other variables but none of the following had significant coefficients: levels 
and changes in infant mortality, government expenditure, military expenditure, primary school enrolment rates, 
secondary school enrolment rates, total years of education, the proportion of the population living in urban 
areas, the number of checks and balances and whether there is proportional representation. 
6 We have truncated the calculation at a horizon of 32 years to allow for mortality.  12 
 
This effect is substantial, with no press freedom the likelihood of winning the election is 92 
percent while it is only 63 percent with full press freedom
7.  
 
We now turn to the question whether the effect of the other variables depends upon illicit 
tactics. We reran the model in column 3 on two samples, one limited to ‘dirty’ elections 
(column 4) and the other to ‘clean’ elections (column 5). We found little evidence that our 
economic and societal variables had differential effects on the outcome of the elections. 
However, the incentives for good economic policy are relatively weaker. Consider an 
incumbent approaching an election who has the choice between policies which deliver zero 
growth and five percent growth. We may presume that the zero growth policies have 
offsetting attractions for the incumbent (graft), though not for the society. In the context of a 
clean election the expected duration in office will be 8.8 years with zero growth and 12.2 
years with five percent growth. Thus, if the leader delivers high economic growth the 
expected time in office can be extended by 40 percent. In the context of a dirty election, 
although zero growth still comes at the expense of a shorter expected duration in office, the 
comparable figures are now 12.2 years and 15.1 years. Promoting growth extends the 
expected time in power by nearly the same absolute amount but this is proportionately far 
smaller, only 23 percent. In the model of Section 2 we adopted a stylized simplifying 
assumption that illicit tactics assured victory, hence eliminating the need for growth. While 
the empirical results show, unsurprisingly, that this is too extreme, they are disturbingly close 
to it. If the presidential utility function has as its arguments both the time in office and graft, 
illicit electoral tactics may come close to sating the desire for time in office, promoting graft 
into being relatively more desirable.  
 
We investigate the impact of press freedom further by running this specification for the 
elections that are ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’. Press freedom has a far larger impact on the outcome in 
dirty elections than in clean elections, the point estimate of the coefficient being about double 
that for clean elections. Further, press freedom makes it considerably less likely for 
incumbents to win dirty elections. The incumbent has a 95 percent chance of winning a dirty 
election if there is no press freedom but this is reduced to 54 percent if there is press freedom.  
                                                 
7 As a robustness check we  created a dummy variables for press freedom and the results were qualitatively 
similar to the ones obtained by using the ordinal press freedom data. 13 
 
 
In order to check for robustness we used some alternative data for clean elections from the 
Cingranelli and Richards data set on human rights (CIRI).  The sample size is greatly 
reduced, but we replicate the main results in columns 6 and 7. The effect of the CIRI variable 
indicating ‘free and fair’ elections is stronger than in our core model. If the elections are ‘free 
and fair’ the chance of an incumbent winning is about 59 percent but if he employs illicit 
tactics this chance increases to 93 percent. 
 
One concern with these regressions is that the logit results can potentially be biased in short 
panels (Greene, 2002). We estimated our core model (column 2) as a linear probability model 
(LMP) and found that our results were qualitatively similar. One disadvantage of this method 
is that predicted values can fall outside the zero/one boundaries. However, we find that the 
LPM does provide a reasonable fit: we predicted the outcome of the elections and found that 
only 6 out of the 536 election results were forecast out of range
8. 
 
A further concern with this type of analysis is that unobserved country specific effects are 
driving the results. The standard way to address this objection is to introduce fixed effects by 
means of a dummy variable for each country. In order to preserve the maximum degrees of 
freedom we follow the method of Hendry et al (2004) which is in three steps. In the first step 
one half of the country dummy variables are entered into the regression. In the second step 
these are replaced by the other half.  In the third step all those country dummies which were 
significant in these two regressions are entered into the model. The advantage of this method 
is that where the country fixed effect is insignificant the observation is retained, whereas in 
the standard fixed effects regression all the observations in which a country had either only 
clean or only dirty elections are lost. We report the results in column 8. Inclusion of the 
country dummies reduces the coefficient on income to half the previous estimate and it 
becomes statistically insignificant. This indicates that income is correlated with the 
unobserved country specific effects. Income may capture institutional characteristics which 
are not included in the model. However, our core result is confirmed: dirty election tactics 
help incumbents win elections. 
 
                                                 
8 Results available on request. 14 
 
To what extent can the above associations be interpreted as genuinely causal? There are a 
variety of potential problems of endogeneity. For example, while economic growth is 
correlated with subsequent electoral success this may be because governments which deliver 
economic growth tend also to deliver a range of other benefits that are valued by voters, but 
which we do not observe. While we acknowledge this limitation, economic performance 
appears to be sufficiently salient to citizen concerns that a direct effect is surely plausible. 
Similarly, the misconduct of elections may be correlated with other, unobserved, strategies 
that incumbents use to win elections. However, there are two good reasons to think that the 
misconduct of elections is not merely proxying these other strategies but is itself crucial. 
First, electoral misconduct directly and necessarily weakens the accountability of ruler to 
voter:  that is what it is meant to do. Secondly, electoral misconduct carries penalties: it 
reduces legitimacy, risks prosecution, and may require expensive bribes. Why would 
incumbents incur these costs if electoral misconduct was merely correlated with an enhanced 
duration in office but did not cause it?   
 
4. Proneness to electoral misconduct 
Electoral misconduct is thus the Achilles heel of democracy. By substantially increasing the 
prospect of incumbent victory it weakens the discipline that elections otherwise exert. We 
therefore turn to the underlying issue of what determines whether elections are clean or dirty?  
We first use the data on all elections, irrespective of whether an incumbent stood. This allows 
us to examine a maximum of 786 elections. There is very little quantitative literature on the 
quality of elections. The study by Jones (2004) uses data from 50 democracies and examines 
what determines the number of candidates in presidential elections. He finds that if an 
incumbent is standing there are fewer candidates taking part in the election, i.e. incumbent 
elections are less competitive. This question is related to our analysis because our definition 
of ‘clean’ elections is mainly based on how competitive leadership elections are.  Our results 
on what determines clean elections are shown in Table 5. 
In column 1 we include all elections on which we have data, whether or not an incumbent is 
standing. Seven characteristics are significantly associated with the probability that elections 
are clean. 
--- Table 4 about here --- 15 
 
Guided by the discussion of Section 2, we first proxy the penalties for illicit tactics. We find 
that two such variables are sufficiently uncorrelated to be introduced together, each retaining 
substantial effects. One of these is checks and balances which is proxied by the number of 
veto points, an example being a legislature which is under the control of the opposition. This 
is an additive measure, the sample mean being three veto points. The other measure of 
penalties is press freedom, measured on a three point scale. Both measures significantly 
reduce the likelihood of illicit tactics, consistent with the prediction of the simple model. One 
additional veto point is approximately equivalent to the move from partial to full press 
freedom.  
Penalties for illicit tactics may also come from external actors. We proxy international 
pressure by a dummy variable set to unity for the period since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Although this does not distinguish between countries, it does mark a clear change in the 
policy priorities of the major international actors. Until the fall of the Soviet Union allegiance 
to power blocs overrode concerns about political governance. The variable is less significant 
that the other proxies for penalties but its effect is quite substantial, being approximately 
equivalent to a doubling of per capita GDP or a quadrupling of population. 
The model of Section 2 predicts that the scope for political rents will increase the likelihood 
of illicit tactics. We proxy this by a measure of natural resource rents as a share of GDP. This 
is a reasonable proxy since a substantial literature suggests that resource rents are liable to be 
captured for political patronage (Robinson et al., 2006, Ross, 2004, Collier and Hoeffler, 
2009). Our results support the hypothesis that the scope for political patronage increases the 
likelihood of illicit tactics: the higher is the proportion of resource rents the less likely is the 
election to be clean. Further, the effect is large: a country at the mean of other characteristics 
but with large rents (50 percent of GDP) has a probability of a clean election of only 34 
percent. If natural resource rents are reduced to zero this probability almost triples to 95 
percent. 
In the model of Section 2 we did not consider the size of the polity. However, there is an 
analytic basis for expecting size to matter. At a general level, accountability is a public good 
and so, like other public goods, is likely to be subject to scale economies (Collier and 
Venables, 2009). More specifically, personalized power relationships are likely to be more 
difficult to maintain the larger is the society.  16 
 
We first proxy size by population. The celebrated result of Dunbar (1992)
9 that the number of 
direct personal contacts of an individual is broadly independent of social context at around 
150, implies that the minimum feasible degree of separation, s, between the ruler and 
ordinary citizens increases in population size, n, according to:  
 
   
The actual degree of separation may be considerably greater than this minimum and so need 
not be monotonic in population size. Nevertheless, the monotonic relationship for the 
minimum supports a presumption that the larger the population the more likely are power 
relationships to be institutionalized rather than personalized, or if personalized, less likely to 
be effective. Consistent with this hypothesis we find that the larger the population of the 
country the higher is the chance that the election is clean.  
While power relationships are most naturally thought of in terms of power over people, 
power over economic transactions may be just as pertinent. The same scale economies 
argument applies to transactions as to people: the more complex the economy the greater the 
need to institutionalize control over them rather than rely upon personal control. Since 
population is already included in the regression, per capita income rather than total GDP is 
the appropriate way to proxy the size of the economy. Per capita income is indeed significant 
in the regression with the same sign as population. However, while one possible 
interpretation of the variable is that it proxies the scale of transactions, since per capita 
income is correlated with many omitted variables there are many other channels by which it 
might be significant. Both ‘scale’ variables have substantial effects, doubling the population 
being approximately equivalent to increasing income by 50 percent. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the effects we can think of stylized characterizations of 
Africa and India prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. The typical African society has only 
one veto point, no term limits, no press freedom, a population of 10 million, a mean level of 
per capita income of $840, and resource rents of six percent of GDP. With these 
characteristics, the chance of a clean election predicted by the regression is only 3 percent. In 
contrast, India has a population of around one billion, around 3 percent of GDP in natural 
resource rents, 4 veto points, and a relatively free press. Its predicted chances of a clean 
                                                 
9 This result was popularised by Gladwell(2000). 17 
 
election are 80 percent. Onto these initial positions, now introduce the international 
democratizing wave consequent upon the fall of the Soviet Union. In ‘Africa’ the chance of a 
clean election increases from 3 percent to 6 percent, while in ‘India’ it increases from 80 
percent to 88 percent.  
We now introduce term limits. The model of Section 2 predicted that term limits would 
reduce the likelihood of illicit tactics, but through an interaction effect with natural resource 
rents. We first introduce a dummy variable for term limits into the regression of column 1. It 
is significant, but this may be due to the correlation of term limits with other aspects of the 
society rather than being causal. In column 2 we add an interaction term between resource 
rents and term limits. The interaction is not significant. However, recall that so far our sample 
has included all elections, whether or not an incumbent was standing. Since the theory of 
illicit tactics of Section 2 is essentially about how incumbents can abuse their power, we now 
investigate whether resource rents matter more in elections where incumbents are standing. In 
column 3 we introduce a dummy variable for whether the incumbent is standing, and an 
interaction term between this dummy and resource rents. Now, while the direct effect of the 
dummy is not significant, the interaction is significant and negative: resource rents advantage 
incumbents. Further, once this interaction is introduced, the direct effect of natural resource 
rents becomes negligible and insignificant: resource rents only increase the risk of illicit 
tactics if an incumbent is standing. The implication that natural resource revenues help 
incumbents to win elections is consistent with the theory proposed by Robinson et al. (2006) 
whereby the incumbent uses the revenues to finance public sector employment patronage and 
beneficiaries rationally vote for him in order to retain their jobs. A key point in their 
argument is that while opposing candidates may say that they will retain beneficiaries on the 
public payroll, such statements lack credibility. Our result that once the incumbent is not 
standing resource rents lose their efficacy is consistent with this thesis: in effect, in the 
context of personalized power networks beneficiaries of previous patronage have little basis 
for trusting any successor.  
The results of regression (3) lead us to a further investigation of term limits. Recall that the 
theory of Section 2 predicts that term limits should reduce illicit tactics by incumbents, but 
only through an interaction with resource rents. In column 4 we consider only the subset in 
which an incumbent is standing in a country that has non-zero resource rents. On this sample 
we reintroduce the interaction of resource rents and the dummy for term limits. Now the 18 
 
direct effect of term limits reverses sign and becomes insignificant. The interaction with 
resource rents is significant and positive as predicted: term limits reduce the incidence of 
illicit tactics, but only where there is an incumbent standing and resource rents are available.  
We now subject the above results to tests for robustness. We first use a different data source 
for our dependent variable, switching to the data on whether elections are ‘free and fair’. In 
column 5 we rerun our core specification of column 1. This reduces our sample size 
drastically from 576 to 389 observations. Despite this reduction in sample size we still find 
that our main results hold. Higher income, more veto players, press freedom and term limits 
increase the chance of clean elections while natural resource rents reduce it. For this sample 
we do not find the size of the population and the democracy wave to be significant. In column 
6 we use the CIRI freedom of speech variable and confirm that this increases the likelihood 
of a clean election. 
As in the incumbent election analysis presented above, we are concerned whether unobserved 
country specific effects drive our results. We include the significant country dummies in our 
core model and report these results in column 7. The size of the population and the 
democracy wave lose statistical significance but all of the other results, including per capita 
income and natural resource rents where fixed effects might be a particular concern, are 
unaffected. As with the effect of electoral misconduct on the duration in office, a good reason 
for interpreting the effect of veto points on the risk of electoral misconduct as causal is that 
they are meant to restrain abuses of power.  
Does Aid Matter? 
We now turn to the question of whether aid has an effect on the likelihood of whether 
elections are clean or dirty. From our results so far we might expect that aid would have two 
opposing effects. Recall that the international pressure for democracy, proxied by the fall of 
the Soviet Union, increased the probability that an election would be clean. Aid gives the 
international community a potential pressure point to encourage the clean conduct of 
elections. Offsetting this effect, aid is somewhat analogous to government revenue from 
natural resource rents in that it reduces the need to raise revenue by taxing citizens and so 
may reduce pressure for accountability. A priori, either of these could predominate. 19 
 
Analogous to our analysis of rents we limit the sample to countries in receipt of aid and 
where an incumbent is contesting the elections: Table 6 presents our analysis. Column 1 is 
our core logit regression with the addition of aid. Although the sample is considerably 
reduced, as in our core model the democracy wave, veto players, term limits and press 
freedom make it more likely that the elections are clean. In this regression aid is not 
significant. However, a potential limitation of this specification is that aid may be 
endogenous. We broadly follow Tavares (2003) in our choice of instruments for aid, using 
the total aid given by the top five bilateral donors (US, UK, Japan, France and Germany) and 
their historical and cultural ties with the recipients to instrument for the amount of aid they 
allocate to recipient countries. Since it is not possible to adopt the IV approach in a logit we 
switch to a linear probability model: in column 2 we test the same specification as column 1, 
the results being similar. In column 3 we instrument aid which remains insignificant. 
------- Table 5 about here ------ 
In the remaining columns we investigate whether aid might have effects through interactions 
with other key variables. We first introduce interaction terms into the logit specification and 
then turn to the linear probability model, instrumenting aid and testing down by the 
elimination of insignificant terms. In the final regression of column 7 aid has two effects 
which are jointly significant ( 
2=4.6, p=0.10). The direct effect of aid is adverse, making 
clean elections less likely. This is offset by a favourable interaction with checks and balances: 
aid enhances the efficacy of veto points. Taking the results at face value, they suggest that aid 
enables the international community to reinforce domestic due process, but does not 
empower it to replace due process where none exists. The effect is small. The mean level of 
aid, for countries in which it is non-zero, is seven percent. In the absence of aid the chance of 
a clean election is 64 percent, whereas at double the mean level of aid the chance rises to 67 
percent. Our results imply that unless aid is explicitly conditioned upon the good conduct of 
elections, if the donor wishes to ‘do no harm’ a cautious approach may be needed in countries 
where effective checks and balances are weak or missing. In a country with only a single veto 
point but otherwise average characteristics aid reduces the chances of a clean election from 
61 percent to 60 percent: the adverse direct effect predominates. However, the main result 
from our analysis of aid is that there do not appear to be strong net effects: there may well be 
no net effects.  20 
 
5. Do Clean Elections Matter for Economic Performance? 
So far we have presented evidence that illicit tactics substantially increase the chances of 
winning an election and we have discussed the circumstances in which it is most likely that 
illicit tactics are used. We now turn to the question of whether clean elections matter for 
economic performance. 
The literature on economic voting focuses on developed countries and finds strong evidence 
that governments are re-elected on the strength of their economic policies. The recent work 
by Leigh (2009) suggests that a wealthier and more educated electorate is more likely to 
reward incumbents for their economic policies. Furthermore, the electorate distinguishes 
between 'luck' and 'competence'. Economic growth may simply be due to a flourishing world 
economy ('luck') rather than to the leader's economic policy choices ('competence'). In richer 
countries voters are more likely to distinguish between 'luck' and 'competence' and support 
incumbents when they have delivered economic growth. 
Thus, elections provide an incentive to deliver good economic outcomes. There is now also 
evidence that this holds for developing countries. Chauvet and Collier (2009) investigate the 
relationship between elections and economic policies. They find that controlling for the 
policy cycle that elections generate, regular elections have structural effects, significantly and 
substantially improving the overall level of policies. However, this benign effect is 
conditional upon the proper conduct of elections. Using a measure of electoral conduct close 
to that which we have adopted, they find that badly conducted elections exert no significant 
policy discipline.  
In resource-rich countries voters may face particular difficulties in disciplining governments 
to good economic policies. Economic performance is subject to large shocks from 
fluctuations in world prices and resource discoveries, making the task of disentangling the 
component due to competence as opposed to luck more difficult than in resource-scarce 
countries. Further, recall that we have found that resource rents substantially increase the risk 
of electoral misconduct. Consistent with these concerns, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) find that 
electoral competition has had distinctively adverse effects on economic growth in countries 
that are resource-rich. The adverse effect can be countered by sufficiently strong checks and 
balances as measured by veto points, which is again consistent with our above results that 
veto points substantially reduce the incidence of electoral misconduct.  21 
 
 
The proposition that clean elections discipline incumbents to good economic policies whereas 
dirty elections relax this discipline has a testable implication for the relationship between 
changes in leadership and economic performance. In a celebrated study based on a large 
panel data set Jones and Olken (2005) found that exogenous changes in leadership 
significantly affect economic growth: leaders matter. We now revisit these results. 
Potentially, those changes in which both an incumbent and his successor are subject to the 
discipline of clean elections may reduce the potential for changes in economic performance. 
The major changes in performance attributable to leadership change may occur where leaders 
are not subject to electoral discipline.  
 
The investigation of the importance of leadership is based on a simple panel growth 
regression. Jones and Olken concentrate their analysis on exogenous changes in leadership, 
finding that the economic growth rates were significantly different before and after leader 
deaths. We re-examine their findings in Table 6 in the first row. As in their analysis we 
regress annual growth rates from 1950 until 2000 on dummy variables indicating the five 
years before and after each leader's death. The regression also includes time and regional 
dummies and uses all available observations, i.e. in addition to the 57 leaders who died in 
office it also includes observations when no leader died in office. Using a Likelihood Ratio 
Test we cannot reject the hypothesis that economic growth was the same before and after the 
leader’s death. As the critical values indicate this acceptance of the null is marginal at 
conventional levels. However, we cannot confirm Jones and Olken’s result that ‘leaders 
matter’ in this sample. We then focus our analysis on the 44 leader deaths in autocracies in 
line 2. Here, we decisively reject the hypothesis that the growth rates before and after the 
leaders' deaths are the same, i.e. in autocratic regimes 'leaders matter'. How about leadership 
in democracies? According to our theory clean elections discourage corrupt politicians and 
encourage economic voting. For the 13 deaths that happened in democratic regimes we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that growth rates before and after the leader’s death are the same. 
If a leader dies in a democracy this has no impact on economic performance, leaders only 
‘matter’ in non-democratic regimes. While this result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
clean elections reduce the importance of individuals, it is not a very powerful test. There are 
only 13 observations of leaders who die in office while subject to clean elections and the lack 
of statistical significance may be due to the small size of sample. However, the result is not 22 
 
simply due to the difference in sample size. The average (squared) value of the change in 
growth attributed to changes in leaders subject to clean elections is only half that where 
leaders are not so disciplined.  
 
---------Table 6 about here ------- 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
Elections are potentially the technology by which government is held to account by citizens, 
in the process imposing discipline on economic policy. In this paper we have shown that 
illicit electoral tactics are highly attractive for incumbents. The strategy of using illicit 
electoral tactics trumps strategies confined to licit tactics, more than doubling the expected 
duration in office at the means of other variables. Additionally, illicit tactics sharply reduce 
the incentives for the incumbent to attend to economic performance.  
If illicit tactics are so attractive for incumbents, they will be adopted unless there are 
restraints upon them. We found some evidence that conventional checks and balances, 
notably veto points, press freedom and term limits, are all potent checks on illicit tactics. 
International pressure also appears to be effective, at least as proxied by the fall of the Soviet 
Union. However, disturbingly, we found that there are structural characteristics which expose 
a society to the risk of illicit tactics. Specifically, low-income countries with small 
populations and large rents from natural resources have a very low chance of clean elections 
unless they already have a range of checks and balances. Since checks and balances are 
processes which take time to establish whereas elections are simply events, this may explain 
why the introduction of ‘instant democracy’ to Africa during the 1990s has had only limited 
success in establishing accountable and legitimate governance.  We investigated whether aid 
had affected proneness to electoral misconduct. Analytically its effect is ambiguous and we 
found that any net effect has been modest.  
The misconduct of elections can be expected to subvert the discipline otherwise exerted on 
governments to achieve good economic performance. A testable implication is that changes 
of leadership would only matter in polities where leaders were not subject to clean elections. 23 
 
Revisiting the Jones and Olken result that leadership matters, we have found that their data 
are consistent with this hypothesis. 
In conclusion, there are powerful incentives for electoral misconduct. Where it occurs it has 
adverse economic consequences, enabling leaders to adopt policies of patronage rather than 
growth. Some societies are structurally prone to electoral misconduct, specifically those 
which are low-income, resource-rich and small. Although electoral misconduct can be 
countered by checks and balances such as veto points and a free press, the wave of 
democratization following the fall of the Soviet Union introduced elections into small, low-
income, resource-rich societies in which they were particularly weak. The main potential 
international pressure-point for the good conduct of elections in these societies has been aid, 
but we find that any effects have been modest and, indeed, ambiguous.     24 
 

















Table 1: How many Elections are Contested by Incumbents? 
 Dirty Elections  Clean Elections  Total
Incumbent did not 
stand
73  155  228 (29%) 
Incumbent election  251  307  558 (71%) 





Table 2: How many Elections are Won by Incumbents? 
 Dirty Election  Clean Election  Total
Incumbent loses  48  132  180 (32%) 
Incumbent wins  203  175  378 (68%) 




Table 3: How do Incumbents Win Elections? 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SSAfrica  1.329  1.193  1.200  0.722  1.702  1.053  1.107  2.366   
(3.23)***  (3.61)***  (3.66)***  (1.88)*  (2.48)**  (2.34)**  (2.30)**  (4.52)***   
GDP growth  0.074  0.068  0.079  0.073  0.091  0.088  0.099  0.089   
(2.85)***  (2.79)***  (2.94)***  (1.82)*  (2.28)**  (2.58)***  (2.73)***  (2.99)***   
Ln GDP per 
capita 
0.151  0.187  0.420  0.323  0.396  0.275  0.392  0.095   
(1.48)  (2.07)**  (3.91)***  (1.73)*  (3.08)***  (2.33)**  (2.86)***  (0.85)   
Clean election  -1.017  -1.168  -0.647          -1.027   
(3.81)***  (4.44)***  (2.17)**          (3.29)***   
Press Freedom      -0.962  -1.393  -0.611    -0.710     
    (4.52)***  (4.89)***  (2.08)**    (2.25)**     
Free&fair election            -2.235  -1.534     
          (5.54)***  (2.90)***     
Democracy Wave  -0.275                 
(1.27)                 
Population 
Growth 
0.064                 
(0.50)                 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
-0.083                 
(1.05)                 
Natural resource 
rents 
0.011                 
(0.79)                 
Age -0.009                 
(0.92)                 
Illegal entry  -0.072                 
(0.18)                 
Observations 529  536  483  206  277  343  339  536   
PseudoR2  0.09  0.08  0.12  0.16  0.06  0.13  0.14  0.188   
Log Likelihood  -308.60  -312.72  -270.10  -88.30  -178.30  -184.60  -180.08  -280.46   
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: Incumbent election outcome (0 if incumbent lost, 1 if incumbent 
won), growth measures as the average growth rate of per capita income over the past two years. Column 3 
includes country dummies. Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.     27 
 
Table 4: What Determines Clean Elections? 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Democracy Wave  0.576  0.609  0.567  0.588  0.637  0.617  0.580 
(1.96)*  (2.04)**  (1.91)*  (1.37)  (1.16)  (1.92)*  (1.54) 
Ln Population  0.226  0.218  0.202  0.217  0.307  0.249  0.150 
(2.13)**  (2.05)**  (1.89)*  (1.32)  (1.30)  (2.10)**  (1.04) 
Ln GDP per capita  0.551  0.549  0.561  0.928  0.474  0.644  0.904 
(3.59)***  (3.55)***  (3.49)***  (4.85)***  (2.13)**  (3.63)***  (2.83)*** 
Natural resource rents  -0.072  -0.079  0.014  -0.299  -0.102  -0.078  -0.091 
(2.94)***  (2.75)***  (0.35)  (2.56)**  (3.53)***  (2.99)***  (2.36)** 
Checks  1.056  1.053  1.076  1.307  1.459  1.139  1.867 
(6.17)***  (6.13)***  (6.28)***  (5.42)***  (4.69)***  (6.24)***  (6.40)*** 
Press freedom  1.040  1.033  1.082  0.340  2.468    1.325 
(3.93)***  (3.87)***  (3.98)***  (0.72)  (4.65)***    (4.04)*** 
Termlimit 0.979  0.728  0.820  -1.941  1.532  1.144  1.1453 
(2.36)**  (1.34)  (1.82)*  (1.28)  (2.70)***  (2.73)***  (2.40)** 
Rents*termlimit   0.061    0.392       
  (1.10)    (2.29)**       
Incumbent standing      0.229         
    (0.51)         
Rent* incumbent st.      -0.120         
    (2.21)**         
Rents*checks        -0.026       
      (2.46)**       
Rent*press freedom        0.101       
      (2.08)**       
Freedom of speech            0.766   
          (2.47)**   
Observations  576  576  576  380  389  505  576 
PseudoR2  0.55  0.55  0.56  0.67  0.75  0.52  0.67 
Log Likelihood  -161.59  -161.16  -158.31  -79.70  -58.98  -149.01  -116.12 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: ‘clean’ elections (0 if ‘dirty’, 1 if ‘clean’) in columns 1-4, 7 and 
'free&fair' elections (0 if not 'free and fair' and 1 if 'free and fair') in columns 5 and 6. Robust z statistics in 
parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Does Aid Encourage Clean Elections? 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Logit  LPM  2SLS  Logit  LPM  2SLS  2SLS 
Democracy Wave  0.612  0.093  0.094  1.102  0.115  0.120  0.113 
(1.82)*  (1.90)*  (1.92)*  (2.31)**  (1.82)*  (1.93)*  (1.81)* 
ln Population  0.176  0.017  0.016  0.272  0.047  0.056  0.057 
(1.49)  (0.99)  (0.92)  (1.52)  (1.62)  (1.88)*  (1.98)** 
ln GDP per capita  0.331  0.049  0.047  0.275  0.071  0.080  0.080 
(1.72)*  (1.52)  (1.32)  (1.01)  (1.52)  (1.55)  (1.64) 
Aid  0.018  -0.000  -0.000  -0.259  -0.012  -0.015  -0.010 
(0.80)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (1.90)*  (1.55)  (1.31)  (1.56) 
Checks  1.090  0.110  0.110  1.060  0.094  0.074  0.070 
(5.74)***  (4.94)***  (5.01)***  (3.96)***  (2.95)***  (2.65)***  (2.58)*** 
Press freedom  0.948  0.173  0.173  0.371  0.132  0.146  0.167 
(3.55)***  (4.04)***  (4.09)***  (0.96)  (2.16)**  (2.20)**  (3.33)*** 
Termlimit 1.459  0.193  0.193  0.196  0.088  0.117  0.139 
(3.05)***  (3.12)***  (3.15)***  (0.13)  (0.94)  (1.42)  (2.04)** 
Aid*termlimit       0.235  0.011  0.004   
      (0.99)  (1.16)  (0.39)   
Aid*Checks        0.009  0.001  0.006  0.006 
      (0.31)  (0.48)  (1.66)*  (2.11)** 
Aid* Press freedom        0.109  0.006  0.003   
      (2.31)**  (1.18)  (0.49)   
Observations  340  340  340  213  213  213  213 
(Pseudo)R2  0.42  0.43    0.49  0.48     
Log Likelihood  -134.94      -75.09       
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: ‘clean’ elections (0 if ‘dirty’, 1 if ‘clean’). Robust z statistics in 
parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Aid is measured as a percentage 
of  GDP and averaged over the three years prior to the elections. 
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Table 6: Leaders only Matter if there are no Clean Elections 








All leader deaths  57 69.2  75.6  71.0 
Leader deaths in 
autocracies 
44 61.3  60.5  56.4 
Leader deaths in 
democracies 
13 8.7  22.4  19.8 
Note: The table presents the results from likelihood ratio tests (LRT). Based on a simple growth regression we 
test the null hypothesis that growth is the same before and after the leader's death. Annual growth rates are 
regressed on a number of regional dummies and includes dummies for the five years before and after each 
leader's death. The regression includes observations from all countries, irrespective of whether or not they 
experienced a leader death (n=5668). We ran an unrestricted model and a restricted model in which we 
restricted the dummies to be equal to each other before and after the leader's death. The regressions were 
estimated by OLS and the LRT statistic = 2(LUR - LR) was obtained, where LUR is the log likelihood from the 
unrestricted model and  LR the log likelihood from the restricted model. This statistic is distributed as a   2 
statistic where the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of restrictions (in our case equal to the number of 
leader deaths). We use the LRT because it allows for the possibility that the model is misspecified. We would 
like to thank Ben Jones and Ben Olken for making their dataset available to us.  30 
 
Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
 
Age 
This variable measures the age of the political leader. Source: Archigos (Chiozza, Goemans 
and Gleditsch, 2009). 
 
Checks 
This variable captures the number of veto players. A country has the minimum of one check  
if the electoral competitiveness is below six (see data description of ‘clean’ elections). This 
index is incremented by one if the electoral system is competitive. Increments are given for a 
different types of veto points, e.g. if the opposition controls the legislature, an increment is 
given for each party in the government coalition and for each chamber in the legislature. The 
maximum value comes to 18. Data Source: DPI (Beck et al, 2001). 
 
Clean Elections 
Is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the election is ‘clean’ and zero otherwise. Our 
definition of clean is based on two variables from DPI (Beck et al 2001): competitiveness of 
the elections and election fraud. DPI provides a measure of the competitiveness of elections 
on a scale of one to seven. If the country has elections but only one candidate contests the 
elections the competitiveness is scored as 3, elections in which one party stands but allows 
the choice between several candidates are scored 4 etc up to 7 which denotes muliparty 
elections in which the winning party got less than 75 percent of the votes.  A further (dummy) 
variable describes whether vote fraud or candidate intimidation were serious enough to affect 
the outcome of elections. We define ‘clean’ elections when the election competitiveness 
score was at the maximum seven and no election fraud was observed. 
 
Democracy Wave 
Dummy variable, takes a value of one for the years 1990 and after. 
 
Free and Fair Elections 
We used the variable on ‘Electoral Self-Determination’ from the Cingranelli and Richards 
data base to code ‘free and fair elections’. If citizens had the right to self-determination 
through free and fair elections in both law and practice (score of 2) and the election was 




We used the variable ‘freedom of speech’ from the Cingranelli and Richards data base. This 
variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by 
government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of 
restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, speech or expression. Expression may be in 
the form of art or music. A score of 0 indicates that government censorship of the media was 
complete; a score of 1 indicates that there was some government censorship of the media; and 
a score of 2 indicates that there was no government censorship of the media in a given year. 
Source: Cingranelli and Richards, Version 12.07.08 
 
Ln Population 
Logarithm of the total population. Source: WDI, 2008. 
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ln GDP (t-1) 
The logarithm of per capita income measured in the previous year. Source: WDI, 2009. 
 
Illegal Entry 
Dummy variable indicating whether the leader came to power in an irregular manner. Source: 
Archigos (Chiozza, Goemans and Gleditsch, 2009). 
 
Incumbent Standing 
This dummy variable takes a value of one if the incumbent is contesting the election and zero 
otherwise. Own research. 
 
Population Growth 
This variable measures the growth in the total population. Source: WDI, 2008. 
 
Pressfreedom 
This variable takes the value 1 if there is no pressfreedom, 2 if the press is partly free and 3 if 
the press is free. Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org 
 
Resource Rents 
We use the same definition as in Collier and Hoeffler (2009). Based on data from the World 
Bank’s adjusted savings project we calculated the rents for each commodity by subtracting 
the cost from the commodity price. We then multiplied the rents per unit by the amount 
extracted and summed across the different commodities. We then calculated the share of rents 
in GDP. Since the rents are provided in current US dollars we used the WDI 2008 GDP in 
current dollars to calculate this share. Natural resources for which rent data were available 
are: oil, gas, coal, lignite, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver and 
gold. Data are available from the World Bank through their ‘Adjusted Net Savings’ project. 
 
Secondary Enrolment Rates 
Secondary enrolment rates are measured as gross rates, i.e. they are calculated by expressing 
the number of students enrolled in secondary levels of education, regardless of age, as a 




Dummy variable, takes a value of one for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and zero 
otherwise. We categorise South Africa as ‘other’. 
 
Term Limits 
Our term limits dummy takes a value of one if there are formal restraints on an executive’s 
term and zero otherwise. These formal restraints mean that the executive’s term is   
constitutionally limited and only limits on immediate reelection are counted. Prime ministers 
are always coded as ‘no term limits’. Source: variable MULTIPL from DPI. (Beck et al 
2001). Note that we have coded term limits one when MULTIPL equals zero and vice versa 
to allow for a more intuitive interpretation. 
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